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Breathes New Life into Pure Third-Party
Retaliation Claims Under Title VII
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I. INTRODUCTION
Eric Thompson worked as a metallurgical engineer for North
American Stainless, LP (Stainless) for six years.1 Three years into
Thompson’s employment, Stainless hired Miriam Regalado as a qualitycontrol engineer.2 Shortly after Thompson met Regalado, the two began
dating.3 Their relationship was common knowledge at the company, and
the couple eventually became engaged to be married.4
While employed at Stainless, Thompson’s fiancée, Regalado, felt
that her supervisors treated her differently because she was a woman.5
The open disrespect Regalado’s supervisors displayed led to disrespect
by Regalado’s subordinate employees.6 Eventually, Regalado suspected
one of her subordinate employees was deliberately sabotaging equipment
in order to have Regalado removed.7 When her concerns were not addressed by Stainless, Regalado filed a complaint with the Equal Em† J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2011; B.A., Business Administration, Gonzaga
University, 2006. I would like to thank my parents, Pat and Margie Costello, and my entire family,
Kerri, Tom, Meghan, and even Danny for their support. I would also like to thank all the members
of the Seattle University Law Review, especially the frequenters of the publications office (for making me laugh).
1. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 567 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2009).
2. Brief of Plaintiff at 6, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 435 F. Supp. 2d 633 (E.D. Ky. 2006)
(No. 3:05-02-JMH).
3. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 806.
4. Id.
5. Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 2, at 8.
6. Id. at 9.
7. Id.
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ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).8 The complaint alleged
that Stainless discriminated against her based on her gender.9 Three
weeks after Stainless received Regalado’s complaint, the company terminated her fiancé, Thompson, despite giving Thompson a favorable
evaluation only three months earlier.10
In response, Thompson filed suit in federal district court alleging
that Stainless unlawfully retaliated against him in violation of Title VII’s
anti-retaliation provision.11 This provision prohibits employers from taking adverse actions against an employee as a result of the employee’s
opposition to an unlawful employment practice or the employee’s participation in an investigation of an unlawful employment practice.12 If an
employee raises a Title VII concern, the employer may not retaliate
against that employee.13
Despite Thompson’s allegations that Stainless fired him because of
a Title VII complaint, the district court dismissed his claim.14 The court
held that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision does not protect Thompson
because the provision requires that an individual personally engage in a
protected activity; that is, the individual must oppose an unlawful employment practice or participate in an investigation.15 Because Thompson had not personally opposed or participated, the court ruled that
Thompson had not done anything that qualified as a protected activity.16
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s reading of the
statute.17 The Sixth Circuit held that while Regalado, by filing a complaint with the EEOC, had engaged in a protected activity and, thus, was
protected from any retaliatory action by Stainless, this same provision
did not protect her fiancé, Thompson.18 In so holding, the Thompson
court joined the majority of circuit courts in the view that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision does not provide protection to close associates
and relatives who are victims of adverse employment actions as retaliation against an employee raising a Title VII claim.19
8. Id. at 10.
9. Id. at 8.
10. Id. at 14.
11. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 567 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2009).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).
13. Id.
14. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 806.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002); Smith v. Riceland
Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 820 (8th Cir. 1998); Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th
Cir. 1996).
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The Thompson court’s holding aligns with other courts’ narrow
reading of the class protected by Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.20
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of the antiretaliation provision is to encourage employees to bring claims of discrimination and “deter the many forms that effective retaliation can
take,”21 the majority of courts continue to deny the anti-retaliation provision’s protection to victims of third-party retaliation such as Thompson.22
But in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the
scope of protected classes by expanding the definition of how an individual may “oppose” an unlawful employment practice and what individuals qualify for protection under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.23 Under Crawford’s definition, opposing an unlawful employment
practice may be accomplished without active behavior, and protection
may even be afforded to those who harbor silent opposition.24
Crawford’s expansive definition of the term oppose should be read
to extend protection to previously unprotected third-party victims of retaliation. The policy of Title VII—to eradicate discrimination in the
workplace25—as well as the policy of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision—to foster an environment in which employees will not be dissuaded
from bringing forward claims of discrimination26—mandates that courts
extend the protection of these provisions to those who are victims of retaliation as a result of a relationship with a party who brings forward a
Title VII discrimination claim. The expanded definition of oppose provided by Crawford allows courts to make such an extension.
This Comment argues that courts should read Crawford’s expanded
definition of oppose to extend the protection of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision to pure27 third-party victims of retaliation. Part II of
this Comment presents a history of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.
Part III discusses the holding of Crawford and its potential impact on
pure third-party retaliation claims under Title VII. Part IV explains how
reading Crawford to allow third-party retaliation claims furthers the poli20. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Riceland Foods, 151 F.3d at 820; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227.
21. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006).
22. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d 561; Riceland Foods, 151 F.3d 813; Holt, 89 F.3d 1224.
23. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850
(2009).
24. Id.
25. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009).
26. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 63–64.
27. “Pure” third-party retaliation means the victim of the employer’s retaliation “has committed no offense other than having a relationship” with the protected employee. Alex B. Long, The
Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in the
Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 933–34 (2007).
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cy goals of Title VII. Part V concludes that courts should read Crawford
as extending Title VII’s anti-retaliation protections to victims of pure
third-party retaliation.
II. REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE VII’S ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION AND
THE HISTORY OF PURE THIRD-PARTY RETALIATION CLAIMS
A principal goal of Title VII is to end discrimination in the
workplace.28 To achieve this goal, Title VII contains several provisions
that protect employees facing discrimination, harassment, or retaliation.29
The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII is essential to accomplishing
the purpose of the statute. This Part explains the purpose and language
of the anti-retaliation provision, the requirements of a retaliation claim,
and the way courts have viewed the anti-retaliation claim provisions as
related to pure third-party claims.
A. Purpose and Language of Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision
Title VII prohibits qualified employers30 from discriminating
against any individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.31 To achieve the primary goal of Title VII—ending workplace
discrimination—the statute relies on individual employees who are willing to bring forward instances of discrimination by filing claims and acting as witnesses.32
Section 704(a) of Title VII sets forth the anti-retaliation provision,
which protects employees who bring claims of discrimination against an
employer.33 The primary purpose in enforcing the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII is to “maintain[] unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms” for employees.34 Because enforcement of Title VII relies
on individuals bringing forth claims, the statute must protect employees
who allege an employer is engaged in a discriminatory practice. If an
employee who raises a concern about her company’s adverse treatment
of women is fired or demoted as a result of raising that concern, not only
28. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674.
29. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2–2000e-3 (2006). These provisions are often referred to as Section 703 and 704. Section 703 provides the substantive protections of Title VII, while Section 704
provides the anti-retaliation provision.
30. A qualified employer includes a “[1] ‘person,’ [2] ‘engaged in an industry affecting commerce,’ [3] who has at least fifteen employees for twenty weeks during the current or preceding
calendar year.” JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES AND
MATERIALS 18 (7th ed. 2009) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006)).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
32. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 66.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).
34. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 54 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346
(1997)).
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will the affected employee be less likely to maintain her claim, but other
employees will also be less likely to bring claims of their own. If not for
the anti-retaliation provision, the effectiveness of Title VII would be
greatly reduced.35 By attempting to protect employees who raise claims
of discrimination, the anti-retaliation provision aims at fostering an environment in which employees feel comfortable bringing forward claims of
discrimination, increasing the effectiveness of the anti-discrimination
provisions of Title VII.36
The language of the anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful for
an employer to discriminate against an employee because “he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this Title,
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.”37 Thus, to qualify
for protection, one must oppose an unlawful employment practice or participate in an investigation.38
There is no requirement that a party seeking protection under the
provision show that actual discrimination took place.39 As part of the
prima facie case for retaliation, the plaintiff need only establish that he
had a reasonable belief that the employer’s employment practice was
unlawful to qualify for protection.40 Thus, if an employee believes that
her employer is engaged in a discriminatory practice and files a complaint, that employer cannot retaliate, even if an investigation reveals that
the employer did not violate Title VII.41 This broad scope of protection
serves the policy goals of Title VII by encouraging employees to invoke
the investigative measures triggered by a Title VII claim42 without fear
that their claims must be successful to be protected.43 This extended protection may make succeeding on a claim of retaliation easier than succeeding on a claim of discrimination under the substantive protections of
Title VII, Section 703. That an employee seeking protection under the
anti-retaliation provision need not prove the employer actually discrimi35. Id. at 67.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 62.
38. See Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008).
39. Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1137 (5th Cir. 1981).
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. A complaining party cannot bring a private suit unless the party first receives authorization
from the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC). Johnson v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co., 558 F.2d 841, 847 n.12 (8th Cir. 1977). The EEOC is charged to investigate the allegation
and attempt conciliation or other such remedial action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2006). Thus, when a
party makes a Title VII claim, it triggers an investigative effort by the EEOC and corresponding
attempts to remedy any unlawful employment practice.
43. See Hearth v. Metro. Transit Comm’n, 436 F. Supp. 685, 688–89 (D. Minn. 1977).
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nated may explain the rise of retaliation claims—10% in the last eleven
years.44 While succeeding on a claim of retaliation may be easier than a
claim under the substantive protections of Title VII, a potential plaintiff
must still prove a prima facie case.45
B. Establishing the Prima Facie Case of Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she engaged in activity protected by
Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action against
him or her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.46
1. Protected Activity
The first element of a prima facie case of retaliation requires an
employee to show she was engaged in a protected activity.47 Title VII’s
anti-retaliation provision uses two clauses to define protected activities:
the “participation clause” and the “opposition clause.”48 These two
clauses protect different kinds of conduct, and courts have held that the
clauses provide different amounts of protection.49
The participation clause protects employees who have “made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.”50 This clause protects individuals who either have made claims of discrimination under Title VII or were involved
in subsequent investigations of discrimination.51 The statute uses the
language “in any manner,” and courts have interpreted this language to
mean an inclusive scope of activities fall under the participation clause.52

44. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS: FY 1997–2009,
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
45. See generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Payne, 654
F.2d at 1130.
46. Payne, 654 F.2d at 1136.
47. Id.
48. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850
(2009).
49. “The distinction between participation clause protection and opposition clause protection is
significant because the scope of protection is different.” Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147,
1151 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 n.4 (4th
Cir. 1998)).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).
52. See Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1151 (“[T]he scope of protection for activity falling under the
participation clause is broader than for activity falling under the opposition clause.” (quoting Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259 n.4)).
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The opposition clause protects employees who have “opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice” by Title VII.53 Conduct protected under the opposition clause need not come in the context
of an investigation or invoke the formal processes of a Title VII claim.54
Because the party’s relation to a Title VII claim is less formal, the scope
of protection offered under the opposition clause is smaller than the participation clause.55 For example, if an employee claims protection under
the opposition clause, courts will analyze whether the opposing conduct
was reasonable under the circumstances.56 Additionally, courts must
balance the interests of the employer in running the business against the
employee’s right to express any grievances.57
The different standards of protection therefore make classification
of an employee’s conduct as either participating or opposing important.
The amount of protection afforded to an individual depending on the
classification can vary significantly.58 For example, an employee’s complaints about low pay based on gender are not protected activities under
the narrower opposition clause, but an employee’s illegal transmission of
unredacted and confidential medical files to the EEOC to support a claim
of discrimination is a protected activity under the broader coverage of the
participation clause.59
2. Adverse Employment Action
The second element of a prima facie case of retaliation requires that
the employer take an “adverse employment action” against the employee.60 Section 704(a) of Title VII states that an employer may not
“discriminate against” an employee as retaliation for that employee’s
engagement in a protected activity.61 Before 2006, the standard for what
actions constituted discriminating against an employee was unclear.62
The Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Rail53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).
54. See Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259.
55. See Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1151.
56. Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1142 (5th Cir. 1981).
57. Id.
58. Compare Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 233 (1st
Cir. 1976) (woman’s repeated complaints that her salary was low because she was a woman was not
a protected activity under opposition clause of 704(a)), with Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1151 (nurse’s
copying and transmitting unredacted and confidential medical records to EEOC, though illegal, was
a protected activity under the participation clause of 704(a)).
59. Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1151; Hochstadt, 545 F.2d at 233.
60. Payne, 654 F.2d at 1136.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).
62. See generally Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title
VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63
MO. L. REV. 115, 130 (1998).
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way Co. v. White clarified the meaning of discriminate against as it relates to Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.63 The Court held that an
action discriminates against an employee who has engaged in a protected
activity if the employee “would have found the challenged action materially adverse.”64 An action by an employer qualifies as materially adverse if the action “might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”65 The Court held the
challenged action must be materially adverse to ensure that “petty
slights” and “minor annoyances” would not become actionable retaliation claims.66 Additionally, the definition sets forth an objective standard: a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the
circumstances, judges the adversity of the employer’s action.67 The
Court intentionally left the standard in general terms, adding that when
courts determine whether retaliation is present, “context matters.”68
The broad standard imposed by the Court provides protection from
a wide variety of employer actions, including adverse actions that take
place outside of the work environment.69 The Court explained that such
an expansive view of adverse actions was necessary because “a provision
limited to employment-related actions would not deter the many forms
that effective retaliation can take.”70 This expansive view aligns with the
anti-retaliation provision’s policy objective—to “allow unfettered access
to statutory remedial mechanisms”—because it protects employees from
retaliatory actions that would likely restrict an employee’s access to the
protections of Title VII.71 Because Title VII enforcement relies on employees bringing forth concerns, and retaliation would lessen the likelihood that they would do so, employers must be barred from retaliating
against employees outside the workplace. The Court’s broad reading of
the language of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision indicates a preference towards a generally expansive reading of Title VII to give effect to
the statute’s policy of ensuring that employees are not deterred from
making discrimination claims.

63. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quoting Rochon v.
Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 71.
68. Id. at 69.
69. Id. at 63.
70. Id. at 64.
71. Id. at 54 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
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3. Causal Relationship
The third element in the prima facie case requires a plaintiff to
show that the employer took the adverse employment action against the
employee as a result of the employee’s engagement in a protected activity.72 This requirement is often the most difficult element for a plaintiff to
meet because direct evidence of the employer’s intent is usually not readily available. To prove such a causal relationship, the plaintiff must
show that the employer was aware that the employee was engaged in a
protected activity.73 Generally, a mere showing that the adverse action
took place soon after the employee engaged in a protected activity is insufficient to demonstrate a causal connection.74 Additionally, the employer can avoid liability by showing that the adverse employment action
would have occurred even if the employee had not engaged in a protected activity.75
C. Third-Party Retaliation Claims
Most courts have been unwilling to extend the protections of Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision to third-party retaliation claims.76 Thirdparty retaliation occurs when an employee has engaged in a protected
activity, and the employer, in an effort to retaliate against the protected
employee, takes an adverse action against an associate or relative of the
protected employee.77 Courts have ruled that these third-parties do not
qualify for protection78 because, under the anti-retaliation provision, an
employee must either oppose an unlawful employment practice or participate in an investigation of suspected unlawful employment practices to
be engaged in a protected activity.79 Because third-parties who are associates of a protected employee have not actively opposed or participated
in investigations, courts have interpreted the language of the statute to
exclude this class of employees from protection.80

72. Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004).
73. See generally Salas v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 493 F.3d 913, 924 (7th Cir. 2007); Shafer v. Kal
Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663, 664–65 (7th Cir. 2005).
74. Kiel v. Select Artificial, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999). But see Thomas, 379
F.3d at 812.
75. See Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1297 (8th Cir. 1980).
76. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002); Smith v. Riceland
Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 820 (8th Cir. 1998); Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc. 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir.
1996).
77. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Smith, 151 F.3d at 820; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227; Long, supra
note 27, at 933–34.
78. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Smith, 151 F.3d at 820; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).
80. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Smith, 151 F.3d at 820; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227.
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Yet, allowing employers to retaliate against those who engage in
protected activities by taking adverse employment actions against the
protected employee’s friends, relatives, and close associates, cuts against
the policy aim of the anti-retaliation provision.81 Prior court decisions
have broadly interpreted the language of this provision to avoid the
“chilling effect” that employer retaliation would have on the likelihood
of other employees bringing claims.82 Additionally, courts have generally held that “anti-discrimination laws are to be liberally construed to effectuate their remedial purposes.”83 The conflict between the interpretation of the language of the retaliation provision and the policy behind the
statute’s enactment has left courts split regarding whether the protections
of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision extend to cover victims of thirdparty retaliation.84
Courts that have refused to extend protection to third-parties have
read the language of the anti-retaliation provision narrowly.85 While acknowledging that such a reading may encourage employers to retaliate
against a protected employee’s friends and relatives, these courts have
maintained that the language of the provision prohibits any other result.86
Based on a strict reading of the anti-retaliation provision, these courts
believe that extending protection to pure third-party retaliation victims
would rewrite the law.87 Courts justify this reading by suggesting that
although the interpretation conflicts with the policy of the anti-retaliation
provision,88 failing to provide protection to third-party victims of retaliation is not patently absurd.89
Some courts have gone further and suggested at least two reasons
why Congress may have intended to narrow the class of protected parties
to those who have either participated in an investigation or opposed an
unlawful practice.90 One reason includes speculation that friends and
family members “at risk of retaliation typically would have participated
81. See Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 122 F. Supp. 2d 335, 347 (N.D.N.Y.
2000).
82. See Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981);
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63–64 (2006).
83. Holt, 89 F.3d at 1231 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (citing MacDonald v. E. Wyo. Mental Health
Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1991)).
84. Compare Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564, Smith, 151 F.3d at 820, and Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227,
with Gonzalez, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 347, and EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206,
1213 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
85. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Smith, 151 F.3d at 820; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227.
86. See, e.g., Holt, 89 F.3d at 1226–27.
87. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 567 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Bojangles
Rest., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 327–28 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
88. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 811.
89. Id. at 808; Bojangles, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 327.
90. See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 811; Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569.
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in some manner in the discrimination charge.”91 Thus, this position is
based on the hope that all associates and relatives that should be protected from retaliation have participated in preparing a Title VII claim.92
This viewpoint also assumes that these associates have participated sufficiently to qualify for protection under the participation clause and can
sufficiently prove a prima facie case of retaliation.93 While courts advocating this reason may believe that occasions of pure third-party retaliation in which the victim has not participated in the discrimination charge
or performed an action opposing an unlawful employment practice are
rare, fact patterns seen in several cases make it clear that these situations
do occur.94 Even if uncommon, it seems absurd that these cases would
somehow not violate the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision when
courts deny these plaintiffs relief.
Another reason for not allowing third-party retaliation claims to
proceed is that such an interpretation may “open the door to frivolous
lawsuits and interfere with an employer’s prerogative to fire at-will employees.”95 But this concern is exaggerated, as seen by a similar provision in the Americans with Disabilities Act,96 and can also be addressed
by the requirement of a causal connection in making a prima facie claim
for retaliation.97
While some policy objections exist to allowing pure third-party retaliation victims to seek redress in court, these objections are easily overcome. The policy behind the anti-retaliation clause of Title VII clearly
supports allowing these plaintiffs to bring claims. Indeed, the Third Circuit stated that interpreting the anti-retaliation provision to prohibit thirdparty retaliation claims “presents a conflict between a statute’s plain
meaning and its general policy objectives.”98 Nevertheless, the majority
of courts do not allow pure third-party retaliation claims under the antiretaliation provision of Title VII.99

91. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 811 (quoting Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569).
92. See id.; Bojangles, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 327–28.
93. See Bojangles, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 327–28.
94. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d at 820 (8th Cir.
1998); Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1996); Bojangles, 284 F. Supp. 2d at
327–28; Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 122 F. Supp. 2d 335, 347 (N.D.N.Y. 2000);
EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1213 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
95. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 570.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2006) (prohibiting an employer from “excluding or otherwise
denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association”).
97. See infra Part IV.C.
98. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569.
99. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Smith, 151 F.3d at 820; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227.
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III. THE IMPACT OF CRAWFORD ON PURE THIRD-PARTY RETALIATION
CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII
The Supreme Court, in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, reexamined the definition of
oppose as it relates to the opposition clause of the anti-retaliation provision in Title VII.100 Section A examines the facts and analysis of the
Crawford decision and section B explores the decision’s impact on pure
third-party retaliation claims under Title VII.
A. The Crawford Case
Veronica Frazier, a human resources officer for the Metro School
District (Metro), conducted an investigation into alleged sexually harassing behavior of a Metro employee—relations director Gene Hughes.101
Frazier’s investigation was internal to the school district and started as a
result of rumors of sexual harassment by Hughes.102 During the internal
investigation, Frazier asked Vicky Crawford, a thirty-year-old Metro
employee, whether she had witnessed any “inappropriate behavior” by
Hughes.103 Crawford responded by attesting to several instances of
Hughes’s sexually explicit behavior.104 During one incident, Hughes
responded to Crawford’s question of “‘Hey Dr. Hughes, what’s up?’ by
grabbing his crotch and saying, ‘[Y]ou know what’s up’” as well as
putting “‘his crotch up to [Crawford’s bus] window.’”105 During another
incident, Hughes entered Crawford’s office and “‘grabbed her head and
pulled it to his crotch.’”106 Two other employees also relayed incidents
of being sexually harassed by Hughes.107
After finishing the investigation, Metro took no action against
Hughes.108 Instead, Metro fired Crawford and the two other witnesses to
Hughes’s behavior.109 Crawford filed a charge of retaliation with the
EEOC, followed by a suit in District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee.110 Crawford claimed that Metro had violated both the oppo-

100. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 849
(2009).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 849–50.
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sition clause and the participation clause of Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision in terminating her employment.111
The district court granted Metro’s motion for summary judgment.112
In dismissing the case, the court held that Crawford did not qualify for
protection under the opposition clause because she had not initiated her
own complaint but simply answered questions in an internal investigation initiated by someone else.113 Similarly, the court held that Crawford’s claim for protection under the participation clause failed as well.114
The court reasoned that, pursuant to Sixth Circuit precedent, a participant
in an internal investigation qualifies for protection under the participation
clause only where the investigation is part of a pending charge by the
EEOC.115 Because the investigation by Metro was internal and not the
result of a pending EEOC charge, Crawford’s participation in the investigation did not qualify her for protection under the participation
clause.116
Crawford appealed the district court’s decision to the Sixth Circuit,
which affirmed.117 The Sixth Circuit stated that protection under the opposition clause “demands active, consistent ‘opposing’ activities.”118
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.119
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed and remanded the Sixth Circuit’s decision.120 The Court determined that the
term oppose, as used in the opposition clause of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, carries its ordinary meaning—“‘to resist or antagonize . . .; to contend against; to confront; resist; withstand.’”121 The Court
also defined oppose to mean “‘to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion.’”122 The Court criticized the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning as undermining the retaliation provision’s primary objective of “avoiding harm to
employees,”123 and stated that the Court has never suggested that an employee may “lose statutory protection by failing to speak.”124 By expand111. Id. at 850.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, 107 F. App’x 607, 610 (6th Cir.
2004)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1710 (2d ed. 1958)).
122. Id. (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1359 (2d ed.
1987)) (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 852 (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).
124. Id. at 853 n.3.
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ing the definition of oppose so broadly, the Court potentially embraces
the notion that the opposition clause protects an employee who opposes
by virtue of “silent opposition.”125 Even if the Court did not intend to
embrace silent opposition, the definition the Court provides is broad
enough to encompass opposition by relationship.
B. Crawford’s Impact on Pure Third-Party Retaliation Claims
Courts should read Crawford’s expansive definition of the opposition clause to offer protection to previously unprotected third-party victims of retaliation. The majority of courts have not been able to offer
protection to pure third-party claimants because the language of the antiretaliation provision requires a plaintiff to oppose an unlawful employment practice or participate in an investigation, and pure third-party
claimants do not raise complaints or participate in investigations prior to
suffering an adverse employment action.126 But the Court’s expansion of
the definition of oppose can be read to allow the passive support of
friends, relatives, and close associates to qualify as opposing an unlawful
employment practice, thus qualifying the third-party for protection under
Title VII.
While the Court’s opinion does not explicitly state that pure thirdparty retaliation claims are covered by the opposition clause, the opinion
contains at least two features that support this reading. First, the Court
criticizes interpretations of the anti-retaliation provision that fail to accomplish policy objectives.127 Second, the Court applies the opposition
clause to a circumstance in which traditional opposition may not have
been present.128
In Crawford, the Court is critical of the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute because it failed to take into account certain policy objectives.129 The Court stated that the Sixth Circuit’s rule largely undermined the statute’s “‘primary objective’ of ‘avoid[ing] harm’ to employees.”130 Additionally, the Court found that the Sixth Circuit’s holding would undermine incentives put into place by the Court’s decisions
in Farager v. Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v Ellerth.131
Both Farager and Ellerth create vicarious liability for employers when

125. Id. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring).
126. See, e.g., Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226–27 (5th Cir. 1996).
127. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 851–52.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 852.
130. Id. (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).
131. Id.
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an employee’s supervisor creates a hostile work environment.132 But
these decisions also create an affirmative defense if the employer “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct” discrimination and the employee did not use certain available processes.133 This scheme was
enacted in part to give employers sufficient motivation to seek out and
prevent discrimination in the workplace.134
The Court in Crawford indicated that the Sixth Circuit’s holding—
allowing employees who answer questions in internal investigations to
be targeted by employers without court protection—would undermine
the policy supported by Farager and Ellerth.135 If allowed, this conduct
might discourage employees from answering questions about discriminatory conduct or aiding in internal investigations, thereby reducing the
effectiveness of the investigations and undermining the rationale for providing an affirmative defense to employers who carry out such investigations.136 The Court’s criticism of the Sixth Circuit’s failure to give effect
to the broad policy of limiting discrimination should serve as an interpretive guide for subsequent court decisions. This criticism supports a reading of the anti-retaliation clause that would allow pure third-party retaliation claims. Failing to provide protection to victims of pure third-party
retaliation is a violation of the policy goals of Title VII—the same type
of violation the Court criticized in Crawford.
A second feature of Crawford that supports allowing pure thirdparty retaliation claims is the Court’s application of the opposition clause
to the facts of the case. The Court held that Crawford’s response to the
investigator’s questions constituted opposition to her supervisor’s harassing actions.137 Notably, the Court cited no characteristics of Crawford’s
responses that qualify her answers as opposition to her supervisor’s conduct.138 Rather, the Court stated that Crawford’s responses qualify as
opposition to the discriminatory conduct because communication to an
employer about the employer’s discriminatory conduct “virtually always
‘constitutes the employee’s opposition to the activity.’”139 Such a presumption of opposition supports the proposition that a third-party—by
virtue of the relationship with a complaining employee—opposes the

132. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 766 (1998); Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 808 (1998).
133. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
134. See generally Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. 775.
135. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852–53.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 850–51.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 851 (citing 2 EEOC COMPL. MAN. §§ 8-II-B(1), (2), p. 614:0003 (Mar. 2003)).
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complained-of unlawful employment practice, thus qualifying for protection under Title VII.
IV. READING CRAWFORD TO ALLOW PURE THIRD-PARTY RETALIATION
CLAIMS FURTHERS THE POLICY OF TITLE VII AND TRUMPS EXISTING
REMEDIES AND COUNTERVAILING CONCERNS
While Crawford’s definition of oppose may allow courts to extend
the protection of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision to victims of pure
third-party retaliation, it does not necessarily require this extension. This
Part argues that courts should extend this protection because it furthers
the policy goals of Title VII in general and the anti-retaliation provision
in particular. This Part further argues that existing remedies are insufficient for victims of pure-third-party retaliation and that concerns of frivolous lawsuits are exaggerated because sufficient safeguards exist to
prevent this result. Using Crawford’s definition of oppose to reach pure
third-party retaliation claims furthers the policy goals of Title VII and
will not result in excessive litigation.
A. Allowing Crawford’s Definition to Reach Pure Third-Party Retaliation Claims Furthers the Policy of Title VII and Unifies Conflicting Signals to Employers
Extending the anti-retaliation provision’s protection to pure thirdparty victims is appropriate for several reasons. First, an expansive reading of Crawford furthers the policy goals of Title VII. Second, such a
reading unifies conflicting authoritative messages sent to employers.
Third, expanding the reach of Title VII aligns with recent developments
affecting the scope of protection of Title VII.
The policy goal of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is to “avoid
harm to employees”140 and to “maintain unfettered access to statutory
remedial mechanisms.”141 The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII is
designed to avoid the “chilling effect” employer retaliation would have
on the willingness of other employees to bring forth claims of discrimination.142 Allowing an employer to retaliate against relatives and close
associates of employees who participate in protected activities under
Title VII would certainly be enough to deter employees from seeking the
protection of remedial statutory mechanisms and chill the willingness of
employees to bring forward claims of discrimination. Thus, extending

140. Id. at 852 (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).
141. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 54 (2006) (quoting Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
142. Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Title VII’s protection to victims of pure third-party retaliation furthers
the policy goals of the anti-retaliation provision.
Extending this protection to pure third-party retaliation claimants
also unifies the messages courts send to employers. Currently, courts are
conflicted about whether pure third-party retaliation victims have a claim
under Title VII.143 Reading Crawford to allow such claims based on an
expanded interpretation of qualified protected activities would result in a
single rule of law and provide a clear message to employers as to what
constitutes a lawful employment practice.
Interpreting Crawford to allow pure third-party retaliation claims
would also clarify a second contradictory message employers receive.
The EEOC, the government entity charged with enforcing federal employment discrimination laws,144 and the courts disagree in their interpretation of the statute. Specifically, before a party can bring a lawsuit
against an employer for violation of Title VII, he or she must first file a
claim with the EEOC.145 Upon receipt of a charge of a statutory violation, the EEOC is required to accept and investigate the complaints.146 If
an investigation determines that the employer is engaged in unlawful
employment practices, the EEOC is required to engage with the employer in attempts at conciliation in order to rectify the practices.147 If the
attempts fail, the EEOC may bring a lawsuit or allow the aggrieved party
to proceed with a private suit.148 Thus, the EEOC’s interpretation of the
applicable employment laws is crucial to the outcome of a dispute.
The EEOC publishes a compliance manual that interprets applicable employment laws.149 The compliance manual states that the provisions of Title VII “prohibit retaliation against someone so closely related
to or associated with the person exercising his or her statutory rights that
it would discourage that person from pursuing those rights.”150 Thus, the
EEOC’s own guidelines prohibit the practice of pure third-party retaliation,151 but many courts have held the practice does not violate the provi-

143. Compare Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002), Smith v.
Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 820 (8th Cir. 1998), and Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224,
1227 (5th Cir. 1996), with Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 122 F. Supp. 2d 335, 347
(N.D.N.Y. 2000), and EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1213 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
145. Johnson v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co., 558 F.2d 841, 847 n.12 (8th Cir. 1977).
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006); FRIEDMAN, supra note 30, at 444.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
148. Id.
149. See generally 2 EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) (1975).
150. 2 EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) §8-II-B(3)(c) (May 20, 1998).
151. Id.
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sions of Title VII.152 This disagreement between the government agency
charged with enforcing Title VII and the courts’ interpretation of the statute sends an unclear message to employers. While the EEOC compliance manual is considered “a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance,”153
in the matter of pure third-party retaliation, the majority of courts have
ruled against the EEOC’s interpretation.154 Interpreting Crawford to allow pure third-party retaliation victims to bring claims would resolve the
conflict between the courts and the EEOC and clarify the mixed message
currently being sent to employers.
Extending Crawford to reach pure third-party retaliation claimants
also aligns with amendments and interpretations that have broadened the
scope of coverage for Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.155 For example, the Court in Burlington Northern expanded the scope of what constituted “discriminating against” an employee because a lesser scope
“would not deter the many forms that effective retaliation can take.”156
Additionally, Congress amended Title VII itself to expand the statute’s
reach.157 The Act first required an employer to have twenty-five employees to be subject to the Act’s provisions, but Congress amended Title
VII to reduce this requirement to only fifteen employees.158 Following
this progression of expanding coverage, courts should expand the scope
of protected activities to include opposition by virtue of association with
an employee who has availed herself of the protections of Title VII. The
Crawford decision allows courts to do this by expanding the definition of
oppose.159

152. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002); Smith v. Riceland
Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 820 (8th Cir. 1998); Holt v. JTM Indus., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir.
1996).
153. Fed. Express v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624, 642 (1998)).
154. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Smith, 151 F.3d at 820; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227.
155. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 852
(2009) (holding that the opposition clause includes passive opposition activities); Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (holding that adverse employment actions are not
limited to harms in the workplace).
156. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 63.
157. Compare 42 U.S.C. §2000e (2006), with 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1971); FRIEDMAN, supra note
30, at 18.
158. FRIEDMAN, supra note 30, at 18.
159. See supra Part III.A–B.
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B. Existing Remedy is Insufficient
Although the majority of courts have not allowed victims of pure
third-party retaliation to bring claims,160 strict adherence to the language
of the statute does allow a remedy for these claims, but this remedy is
ultimately insufficient. The Court in Burlington Northern set the standard for what constitutes retaliatory conduct: if an action “might well
have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination,” it is sufficiently adverse to constitute retaliatory conduct under Title VII.161 Under this standard, a complaining party could
conceivably bring a claim for retaliation when an employer takes an adverse employment action against his close associate or relative.162 Because firing a friend or relative is likely to dissuade a worker from making a claim, this action may give the originally complaining employee a
claim for retaliation.163 The originally complaining employee would be
able to show a prima facie case of retaliation: she engaged in a protected
activity by complaining, suffered an adverse employment action by having her associate terminated, and that adverse action was caused by her
engagement in a protected activity.
Although an employee who makes a claim of discrimination under
Title VII could sue an employer who terminates a close associate or relative, such a suit does not sufficiently affect the policy goals of the antiretaliation provision. The employee bringing suit will not have been directly adversely impacted by the employer’s actions against the associate
or relative. Thus, the remedy available in such a suit will be limited to
emotional distress damages.164 This remedy will neither reinstate the
associate or relative, nor will it be likely to result in sufficient distress165
to elicit much in the way of damages from the employer. As a result, this
remedy will not deter harm to employees or foster an environment in
which employees feel comfortable asserting claims under Title VII.166
Rather, to affect the policy goals of Title VII and the anti-retaliation pro160. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561 (3d Cir. 2002); Smith v. Riceland
Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 1998); Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir.
1996).
161. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68.
162. See Long, supra note 27, at 980.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. The tort of intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress requires outrageous
conduct. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 647 (2d ed.
2008). Terminating a friend is not likely to rise to the level of outrageous conduct necessary to
constitute a viable claim or, if a claim is successful, elicit sufficient damages to compensate for the
loss of one’s job or serve as a deterrent to the employer.
166. Avoiding harm to employees and maintaining access to statutory remedial mechanisms
are two of the primary goals of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. See supra Part IV.A.
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vision, the victims of pure third-party retaliation must be permitted to
bring a claim on their own.
C. Concerns About Applying Crawford to Allow Pure Third-Party Retaliation Claims Can Be Overcome
Critics of Crawford’s definition of oppose claim that the expanded
coverage of the opposition clause may allow any employee who suffers
adverse employment actions to bring a retaliation claim.167 Opponents
fear that Crawford’s broad definition of oppose covers even unexpressed
opposition to alleged unlawful employment practices.168 The concern is
that any employee who suffers an adverse employment action could allege that the employer retaliated against the employee in response to the
employee’s unspoken and unrevealed opposition to an alleged unlawful
practice.
But, as previously noted, safeguards against frivolous claims already exist to overcome this concern. Including a pure third-party’s passive opposition in the category of protected activities only satisfies one
part of a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII.169 To qualify for
protection, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she engaged in activity
protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse employment
action against him or her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.170 Expanding the
opposition clause gives third-party plaintiffs the ability only to meet the
first element of the prima facie case. As part of showing this initial element, a potential plaintiff must still demonstrate a reasonable belief that
the conduct in question was unlawful.171
Most potential plaintiffs will not have trouble satisfying the second
element of adverse employment action. An employee is unlikely to bring
a lawsuit in the absence of suffering an adverse action because the plaintiff will neither have been provoked to sue, nor have a basis for a claim
of damages. Additionally, the Court’s decision in Burlington Northern
expanded what employer activities can constitute an adverse employment
action,172 making it easier for plaintiffs proceeding with claims of pure
third-party retaliation to meet the second element of the prima facie case.

167. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 854
(2009) (Alito, J., concurring); Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 567 F.3d 804, 805 (6th Cir. 2009).
168. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring).
169. Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1136 (5th Cir. 1981).
170. Id.
171. Payne, 654 F.2d at 1137.
172. Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. at 63 (2006); see supra Part II.B.2.
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Yet the third element—causal connection—will serve as an appropriate barrier to frivolous pure third-party retaliation claims because it
requires showing that an employer took an adverse employment action
against an employee because of the employee’s involvement in a protected activity.173 This element is often difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy.
Generally, no direct evidence of the employer’s unlawful rationale for
the adverse employment action is available. This element also requires
that the employer knows the employee is engaged in a protected activity.174 For a pure third-party retaliation plaintiff, this means the employer
must know of the relationship between the originally complaining employee and the third-party victim.
The obstacles in proving the causal connection element make success difficult for a plaintiff claiming retaliation under Title VII. But this
difficulty can also serve as a safeguard to protect employers from frivolous claims. Putting the burden on the plaintiff to show that the adverse
employment action directly resulted from the employee’s engagement in
a protected activity blocks employees from proceeding with meritless
claims. Even if the employee successfully shows he was engaged in a
protected activity, the employee still bears the burden of proving the adverse employment action is causally related to the protected activity.175
In the case of pure third-party retaliation victims, the protected activity
would be opposition by virtue of the relationship to a complaining employee. Thus, the third-party retaliation plaintiff would need to show
that an employer took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff
as a result of the plaintiff’s relationship with a complaining employee, a
challenge sufficient to bar frivolous claims from moving forward.
The necessity of establishing a close relationship in third-party retaliation claims serves as a further bar to frivolous lawsuits. Although
the concurring opinion in Crawford cautioned that such a liberal reading
of the opposition clause “would open the door to retaliation claims by
employees who never expressed a word of opposition to their employers,”176 this concern is remedied by requiring a close association or relationship. By requiring that the third-party has a close association or relationship to the original complaining party, the concern that employees
who do not express opposition may be protected from retaliation is exaggerated. Allowing pure third-party retaliation victims to bring suit does
173. Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004).
174. See generally Salas v. Wisc. Dep’t of Corr., 493 F.3d 913, 924 (7th Cir. 2007); Shafer v.
Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663, 664–65 (7th Cir. 2005).
175. See Thomas, 379 F.3d at 811.
176. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 854
(2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
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not give every employee who suffers an adverse employment action the
ability to bring a lawsuit by claiming the employee harbored silent opposition. Rather, the opposition must exist by virtue of the relationship to
the original complaining party, and as noted earlier, the employer must
be aware of the close association or relationship between the third-party
and the original complaining party. Thus, not every employee who suffers an adverse employment action would be able to qualify for protection. The class or parties who qualify for protection under a broad reading of Crawford is narrow enough to prevent a multitude of frivolous
lawsuits.
Finally, while courts that refuse to offer protection to pure thirdparty retaliation victims have cited concerns of excessive frivolous litigation,177 these concerns are exaggerated. The Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA)—an anti-discrimination statute similar to Title VII—
demonstrates why these concerns are exaggerated. The ADA contains a
provision that expressly allows claims by individuals “with whom the
qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association.”178
For instance, in Trujillo v. PacifiCorp, a husband and wife brought a suit
under the ADA based on the relationship or association provision. The
Trujillos, both employed at PacifiCorp, had a son with a brain tumor.179
PacifiCorp, a self-insured company, paid all medical costs directly.180
Eleven days after the Trujillo’s son suffered a relapse, the employer began investigating both Mr. and Mrs. Trujillo for time theft.181 Eventually, PacifiCorp terminated the couple, removing the Trujillo’s son and his
expensive medical care from the company’s insurance plan.182 The Trujillos were able to sue as victims of discrimination due to their relationship with a member of a protected class, their disabled son.183 Thus, as
Trujillo demonstrates, the ADA explicitly allows claims based on an association or relationship.
This ADA provision suffers from the same practical difficulties that
concern opponents of extending Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision to
pure third-party retaliation. The ADA, by allowing claims to be brought
based on a relationship or association, embodies the broad protection that
courts opposed to extending protection to third-party retaliation victims

177. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 567 F.3d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Bojangles Rest., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 327 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
178. 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(4) (2006).
179. Trujillo v. PacifiCorp, 524 F.3d 1149, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1152.
182. Id. at 1154.
183. Id.
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fear,184 but this provision has not resulted frivolous lawsuits. According
to the EEOC, in 2009 61.3% of all Title VII claims received by the
Commission resulted in a finding of no reasonable cause for concern in
the allegations.185 In the same year, only 59.5% of all ADA claims resulted in a finding of no reasonable cause.186 In fact, Title VII has had a
higher percentage of meritless claims than the ADA for the last twelve
years.187 The ADA, with its broad provision covering parties with associations to qualified individuals, had fewer instances of meritless claims
than Title VII.188 Hence, extending similarly broad protections in a
Title VII context will not result in a higher occurrence of frivolous
claims.
Allowing Crawford’s expanded definition of oppose to include pure
third-party retaliation victims would further the policy objectives of Title
VII and not result in excessive litigation. This interpretation would encourage employees to report discrimination, while the causal connection
requirement would prevent meritless claims. Similar protections contained in the ADA demonstrate that concerns over excessive litigation
are exaggerated.
V. CONCLUSION
Crawford’s expansive definition of oppose in the opposition clause
of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision should be interpreted to allow
pure third-party retaliation claims. When the Supreme Court reduced the
effort required to be considered opposing unlawful conduct, it opened the
door for victims of pure third-party retaliation to be protected. The primary rationale for withholding protection from pure third-party victims
184. This fear is the excessive frivolous litigation that may result from overly broad protected
classes. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 567 F.3d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Bojangles
Rest., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 327 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
185. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964 CHARGES: FY 1997–2009, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm (last
visited Oct. 18, 2010).
186. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF
1990 (ADA) CHARGES: FY 1997–2009, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/adacharges.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
187. Compare U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964 CHARGES: FY 1997–2009, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
titlevii.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010), with U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (ADA) CHARGES: FY 1997–2009,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
188. Compare U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964 CHARGES: FY 1997–2009, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
titlevii.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010), with U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (ADA) CHARGES: FY 1997–2009,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
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was that the language of the statute required personal participation in a
protected activity.189 This limitation, which courts have admitted conflicts with the policy goals of Title VII,190 has been overcome by Crawford’s expansion of the definition of oppose, leading to a broader range
of protected activities.191 The Crawford decision compels a reading of
the anti-retaliation provision to reach pure third-party plaintiffs.192
Additionally, the policy goals of Title VII lend support to an interpretation of Crawford that would extend protection to victims of pure
third-party retaliation.193 Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision encourages
employees to bring discrimination claims forward and ensures access to
the statute’s protections.194 Allowing this interpretation of Crawford limits the ability of employers to suppress Title VII claims through retaliatory conduct and resolves the current contradictory messages regarding
pure third-party protection under Title VII. For these reasons, courts
should interpret Crawford’s expanded definition of the word oppose to
extend protection to pure third-party retaliation victims under the antiretaliation provision of Title VII.

189. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002); Smith v. Riceland
Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 820 (8th Cir. 1998); Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th
Cir. 1996).
190. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569; Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 567 F.3d 804, 811 (6th
Cir. 2009).
191. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 851
(2009).
192. See supra Part III.B.
193. See supra Part IV.
194. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,
54 (2006).

